

## **North-East Nigerian Gen Z's Perceptions of the September 2025 Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism' Social Media Driven Activism in Nepal**

**Sharifatu Gago Ja'afaru**

Department of Mass Communication,

Glorious Vision University, Ogwa, Edo State, Nigeria.

Email: sharifatujaafaru@gmail.com; [sharifatu.gago@gvu.edu.ng](mailto:sharifatu.gago@gvu.edu.ng)

**Livinus Jesse Ayih**

Department of Mass Communication,

Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria.

Email: livinus.ayih@tsuniversity.edu.ng

**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.24312/ucp-jmc.03.02.717>

### **Abstract**

*This study investigated the views of Gen Z Nigerians on transnational digital activism relevant to the interests of the Nepali populace. It aimed to discern the level of awareness and knowledge of the 2025 Nepali activism, the primary social media platforms used to access information about the activism, evaluative perspectives on the activism and its motivational potential, and anti-corruption sentiments in Nigeria. The study was premised on the Networked Publics Theory. This study used the survey research approach and Google Forms for structured questionnaire to target young, digitally engaged individuals in Nigeria's north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa, and Gombe. Out of 400 copies of questionnaire distributed, 367 were used for analysis. The descriptive analytic framework used in the study employed the mean and standard deviation. It was revealed that most respondents learned about the movement through TikTok, Instagram, and X. This study confirms that social media functions as a form of activism and demonstrates, once more, the prominence of digital civic engagement tools*

*among the young demographic. Although respondents expressed appreciation for the movement's relevance and impact, many mentioned developing an interest in activism around anti-corruption and governance discussions primarily after experiencing the protests in Nepal. This suggests that witnessing international activism might stimulate transnational solidarity and local civic activism. The present research highlights the role of digital global activism in linking civic youth movements in developing democracies. This research also advocates for the integration of digital citizenship and the need for global citizenship for the Nigerian populace.*

**Keywords:** Social Media Activism, Youth Participation, Civic Engagement, Digital Democracy, and Corruption.

## **1. Introduction**

The anti-corruption movement spearheaded by Gen Z in Nepal in September 2025 stands as one of the most notable instances of digital activism in South Asia. The activism was fuelled not just by politics, but by deep-seated social frustrations as well, centred around the moral and structural reform of institutions. The most active participants in the movement in Nepal were younger members of the digitally educated generation and, most importantly, they were angry about the inequity, nepotism, and governance deficits. As Barma and Thapa (2025) describe it, the movement was fuelled by discontent after decades of corruption and patronage that eroded trust and respect in democracy. Gen Z members in Nepal forged a digital community of claimers through their social media accounts, demanding the ethical and moral restoration of public trust, which they felt had been compromised. The activism demonstrated the alarming and profound absence of trust between the populace and the leaders, and showed that the South Asian youth have a proactive and transformative attitude toward the use of technology as a tool for activism, rather than for the rebellion we have come to expect with the older generations.

There is a need to understand the context to appreciate the character of this movement. The political instability and elite capture that has characterise Nepal has also propelled the 2025 protests. Contextualizing the protests within the political nested structures, Bhattarai (2025) points to

capture the dominant clan politics through the politically explosive appointment of ambassadors along with nepotism and political family of the clan. The social discontent is also triggered by the opacity and retrogressive democratic institutions, which Paudel and Phuyel (2025) captures. The differential between the lived experiences of citizens and the social contract as well as political reality is distressing. The democratic deficit is especially acute among politically and digitally globalised youth. Where the democratic deficit is felt, discontent is political, and this has configured political activism within social frameworks, as espoused through global activism on social justice and equity, on discontented platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and Twitter (X).

Protestors organising activism in new ways and using technology as a tool sparked a new form of social and political activism. The 2025 youth protests, unlike political actions tied to political parties or trade unions, were unstructured and open to all forms of participation. Barma and Thapa (2025) have noted the unique manner of coordination which took place, as the young activists worked in a unified manner while also seemingly leaderless, depicting the form of social media coordination to both serve as a web and liberating net for un-structured activism. The incorporation of humour, memes and music broadened appeal to the apathetic audience. Sultana and Sharma (2025) highlight how, in South Asia, rap, street art, and spoken word activism culturally produced as a means of political frustration. In this respect, the socially active and politically frustrated youth in Nepal and the politically apathetic audience towards the activism took cues from the social media activism practiced in other South Asian protest cultures, using the internet as a civic classroom and an outlet for creative protest.

Violations of social justice during the protests reflect deeper dissatisfaction with the inequitable distribution of political and economic power. Islam and Mohna (2025) note the region of South Asia exhibits inequitable political and economic power along with weak institutions. These weak institutions foster corruption and create hurdles for reforms. In the case of Nepal, these issues were particularly visible with the integration of personal loyalty and public office by the politicians. As Pozsgai-Alvarez (2025) points

out, this is a symptom of the corruption's multifaceted nature, not merely in the frequency and severity of the act, but also in the economic and social dimensions of corrupt acts that distorts a society. With this, the protests, for the first time, linked individual grievances with social and systemic issues. As noted by Sony, Bigler, and Thieme (2025), this is the same root that is triggering protests in the 'unfolding' health and service sectors in Nepal, exclusion and the demand for dignity. For this reason, the Gen Z movement of 2025 must not be viewed in political isolation, but as part a continuum from a broader, sectoral struggle for justice.

At the same time, the movement showcased both the promise and the limitations of digital activism. As Shrestha and Jenkins (2019) describe, youth activism in Nepal occurs against the backdrop of economic exclusion and political betrayal. For the protesters of 2025, digital means offered rapid communication and the potential for visibility. Yet, they also faced the pitfalls of apathy, misinformation, and surveillance. As Barma and Thapa (2025) describe, protest leaders used encrypted messaging and anonymous digital pages to avoid state surveillance. Still, unfounded misinformation and speculation circulated and diminished trust, a pattern persistent in other South Asian digital campaigns (Reza & Bhuiyan, 2025). These examples illustrate that while technology can assist and empower social movements, the absence of deep-rooted civic organisation and a firm base of institutional change will perennially stifle movement potential.

This movement uniquely built and expanded solidarity across different classes and geographical regions. With the growing role of civil society in Nepal as an intermediary and a bridge linking local communities to civic engagement, youth activists in the country are finding cohesion and deeper entrenchment in civil society. The protests of 2025 were a manifestation of this cohesion and entrenchment. Support extended beyond urban anti-establishment Gen-Z activists in Kathmandu to include students and small business owners from the capital, as well as diaspora communities in the United States, Canada and Australia. The global link and reference of diaspora communities exemplify the 'politics as fun' phenomenon articulated by Mazumdar (2025), the shifting of serious political discourse to a format



that is easy to consume and share, and strategic efforts to make it entertaining and viral. The integration of digital media and the creative use of humour in activism were evident and amplified the focus on the issues of nepotism and corruption.

These occurrences promoted a re-evaluation of older political ideologies. Khadka (2025) considers the Nepalese desire of constructing a socialism-oriented society mostly as a romance. This facilitates the comprehension of the younger section of the population viewing state promises as hollow declarations instead of substantive measures. In regard to the widening discussion of a politically sponsored expectations and an employment crisis as described by Adhikari (2020) which is a crisis of unspeakable magnitude. The Gen Z demonstrators articulated their protests in a way that does not reject democracy but instead calls for a renewal of it. They demanded clean political architecture, equal distribution of rights, and social equity. This character of their protests is similar to the anti-corruption protests, especially in the Global South.

As in the case of South Asia and Africa, the rise of youth activism in Africa has entered and changed the practiced political order Musya (2025) focuses on studying Gen Z movements in Kenya similar to how it was done in Nepal focusing on the morally motivated political framing of the movements, informal leadership, and digital coordination. Such cross-border similarities demonstrate how the younger generations redefine political participation as both individual and collective. This also reinforces the idea of youth movements as instrumental in the democracy as they provide a measure of its active strain.

Although the 2025 Gen Z-led anti-corruption protests in Nepal kicked-off this study, the research stretches way further than just Nepal. It examines how a youth-driven digital movement in one part of the world Nepal gets noticed, interpreted, and even absorbed by young people dealing with their own muddled political and institutional problems in a country completely different which is Gen Z in North-East Nigeria. Through comparatively studying both countries, the study treats both countries not as unequal narrative spaces. Instead, they are considered as two connected stories each

full of frustration, digital engagement, and hope for real democracy. What matters about Nepal's movement is not just what happened there, but how it sparks something recognisable for young people thousands of miles away. It shows that the language of fighting injustice and pushing back against broken systems is something young people everywhere understand, and it shapes how digital activism works across the world today.

This research utilised Networked Publics Theory, as proposed by Danah Boyd in 2008. As the basis of this study, Networked Publics Theory highlights the importance of digital technology on the social frameworks and collective action in a society. The Theory explains the internet, particularly social media, as technology which enables the formation of "networked publics" (or "networked" digitally mediated publics that emerge and dissipate in the interplay of people, technology, and practice). These networked environments make it possible for people to connect, communicate, and organise around issues that overlap by attenuating, and in some circumstances utterly removing, the social and spatial barriers of time, space, and power. Discourse at the individual level is transformed to collective discourse, and the collaboration of largely uncoordinated participants around a common concern allows the construction of digital communities that directly oppose dominant authority and amplify their collective voice.

To comprehend how digital activism can be understood as shared and borderless involves Nepalese young people as well as their global counterparts from North-East Nigeria. The entire movement was mobilised through social media platforms, specifically TikTok, Instagram, and X, which offered the spatial infrastructures for the quick and unconfined flow of ideas. In these environments, involvement breached the limits of geography and class in pursuing inequity, social justice, and the dominant digital narratives common to young people across the world. Technology notably shaped the structure and the freedom of the protests, which Barma and Thapa (2025) also discussed concerning the protests in Nepal during that year. While citizens realised the integrated and pluralistic ideals of the new public democracies, the public discourse of the nation was transformed to incorporate demands for an end to the corruption and nepotism that had long been pervasive.

Networked Publics Theory helps explain why Northeastern Nigerian Gen Zs understand, appreciate, and resonate with the activism in Nepal, despite the geographic and cultural distance. Although geographically far, Nigerian youth digitally and socially network and interact with the framings of issues that are currently being protested in Nepal, contextualizing them in local socio-political frameworks. This is an empirical manifestation of activism that transcends national borders, amplifying the digitally connected and disconnected enraged citizens. For them, social media is a public space. These are the "networked publics" that Boyd (2008) refers to. Within these networked publics, people catalyse resistance and civic participation that spans the globe to share a civic frustration. The use of this theory highlights the reality of youth activism as entirely digital, global, and participatory in nature. It influences the concepts of agency, democracy, and social change in the modern world, redefining and expanding them in the context of the digitally secured world.

In recent years, the political communication aspects of the Gen Z protest in Nepal in 2025 have garnered some attention (Barma & Thapa, 2025; Bhattarai, 2025). Nonetheless, there is still little to no understanding of how youth activism and anti-corruption protests in one region may affect other developing countries. Most of the available research seems to concentrate on the internal social structures of Nepal and the intergenerational social change. External social structures, especially concerning the politically and administratively challenged youth in Africa, particularly North-East Nigeria, have received little to no research attention. Furthermore, previous research focused on the political impacts of the protests, while the psychological and socio-cultural influences on foreign audiences of the Gen Z cohort have been neglected. Therefore, this research seeks to fill this gap by studying North-East Nigerian Gen Z's understanding of Nepal's "Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism" activism to contextual global digital activism and anti-elite sentiments which strengthen civic identity and accountability in other countries in the Global South on the Nepali case.

## **2. Research Objectives**

This study aims to address this gap by focusing on the following research objective:

1. Assess the extent of North-East Nigerian Gen Zs' awareness of the social-media driven activism in Nepal, "Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism," in September 2025.
2. Identify the main social media platforms through which the respondent's obtained information about the activism in Nepal.
3. Examine the perception of the audience regarding the activism in Nepal that was shared through social media platforms, particularly in relation to the focus on corruption and nepotism in Nigeria.
4. Assess whether the respondent's comprehension of social media activism in Nepal has influenced their views on the anti-corruption movement in Nigeria.

## **3. Literature Review**

### **3.1 Overview of the Nepal Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism Protest**

In Nepal, Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism protests started on September 8, 2025. This was because of the release of a document showing nepotism and corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Young activists started protesting on social media with the hashtags #EndNepotismNepal and #GenZForChange. This protest began as a social media demonstration and evolved into a physical protest. In less than eight days of this protest, 250,000 individuals participated in the cities of Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Chitwan, and smaller protests were held in Itahari and Bharatpur (Barma & Thapa, 2025). There were primarily 16 to 30-year-old protesters, mostly university students and unemployed graduates. While the movement was decentralised, it was social media that provided the means to organise and relay information (Bhattarai, 2025). Most of the violence other than the use of song and dance was culturally thematic, as people incorporated their culture and traditions into the activism, with events

designed for the purpose of protest (Bhattarai, 2025). Things got a lot more heated on September 14.

Riot police were deployed, resulting in approximately 67 protesters, 12 officers, and 80 police being arrested, with 90 arrests primarily in Kathmandu and Pokhara (Sony et al., 2025). As angry as they were, protesters decided temporarily not to engage in direct confrontation with the police. While the police were primarily focused on enforcement of order and the civics system, the demonstrators on site were demanding more openness, especially concerning the people, the public, and especially digital platforms.

After the government made limited concessions on 24 September 2025, the 17-day-long protests came to a halt (Barma & Thapa, 2025). So far, 17 days is the longest recorded duration of the protests. Weeks into the protests, the Ministry of Home Affairs claimed there were 1.2 million protest participants. Of the 1.2 million participants, citizens were estimated to have joined the protests virtually via hashtag activism, civic crowdfunding, and citizen journalism (Flame & Gret, 2025). In the protests early days, government officials stated that 'foreign radicals' were guiding the protests, but they never explained what they meant by 'radical.' This led many elites to think that the government was implying that they were 'foreign radicals' to incite mass protests (Bhattarai, 2025). The mass protests prompted the proposed revisions on the abuse of authority and the accountability and transparency legislation. The government had no option but to promise accountability and bureaucratic as well as meritocratic restructuring by the end of October, prompted by a social government petition that had over 460,000 signatures.

It is likely, as Odoh and Olagunju (2025) mentioned, that in Nigeria, that such reforms will get stuck. Unfortunately, accountability without liberation still remains the same in Nepal. Protests organised by Gen Z have initiated important economic and societal changes. One study notes that some public demonstrations resulted in a slowdown of business activities and contributed to a 0.6% loss of the nation's GDP in September (Soegiono et al., 2025). Around 150,00 people were subjected to civil disorder and public transport was disrupted for a week while schools and universities in the entire

Kathmandu valley were shut down (Barma & Thapa, 2025). On the social front, the movement delivered and revitalised faith in civil action for what Nsau, Ndiga, and Kitonga (2025) termed ‘digital civil vigilance’ advocated for by the Kenyan students’ transparency networks. Public outrage led to the resignations of 3 cabinet members and the suspension of 12 more for several weeks on corrupt abuse of power. These members of the ruling class and judiciary were the focus of public pressure (Paudel & Phuyel, 2025). Culturally, #GenZNepal was the center-piece of the #GenZNepal protests, using music, art, and storytelling as forms of peaceful defiance. Digital creativity and construction were encouraged.

The aftermath of the protests reflected the enduring challenges of digital disinformation, called the fragmentation of the political sphere, and the exploitation of the politics of the protests themselves. These are the growing pains of democracies. But, to be fair, a significant portion of the activists, more than 70%, showed remarkable civic engagement in supporting the online petition to continue monitoring the cases. Most analysts such as Soegiono et al (2025) agree that, in a sense, the protests of September 2025 demonstrated a change as incremental as it may be in the public’s protest expectations from the state in terms of accountability and responsibility after years of inaction. In this regard, for the first time, Nepal demonstrated to the rest of South Asia the power and potential of digital activism. This was a key moment for anti-corruption protests in other developing democracies.

### **3.2 Social Media Usage in Campaigns Against Corruption and Nepotism in Developing Democracies**

Activism using social media in developing democracies is a form of defiance and calls for real openness and accountability activism (Bhattarai, 2025). From advanced democracies, where traditional activism strategies have been hijacked by the powers, to developing democracies with weak institutions and limited civic access, social media activism is a brilliant innovation (Odoh & Olagunju, 2025). Activism on social media is the only form of activism that allows the simultaneous exercising of the watchdog role and the mobilising tool activism role. This uniquely integrated activism allows citizens in real time and in real activism on the ground to report corruption, advanced

accountability discourse, and asked for accountability. Information access by citizens has been predominantly passive while information control is vertical. This is no longer the case. Citizens can control the discourse, access real information, and control dialogue. Social media in developing democracies closes the accountability vacuum by letting citizens document the abuse of power, organise for accountability, and summon accountable public holders (Odoh & Olagunju, 2025).

Political favouritism and other forms of cultural hegemony shapes the digital environment; it shows uneven contests between the reformist citizens and the ruling elites (Bhattarai, 2025). The ‘anti-corruption’ campaigns on social media speak to the digital democratisation phenomenon. The linkage between the innovations of civic influencers, systematic corruption, and open databases (blockchain and other forms of civic transparency) is well articulated in (Anagu, et al, 2024; Soegiono et al. (2025). Nonetheless, technology does not seem to assist in these losing movements the civic enthusiasm that the online movements mobilise. Njau et al. (2025) speak about students’ online activism of resource allocation transparency in African universities; its impact is largely defined by the government’s disposition to respond. Ihuoma (2025) similarly observed how campaigns like Nigeria’s ‘#EndBadGovernance’ experienced struggles at home, in spite of digital support and visibility. Threat perception by the state sparked the implementation of counter measures. This is typical of developing regions, where the governments’ anti-corruption strategy relies on surveillance, misinformation, and other subversive means. Electronic activism, contradictory as it is, shows how empowered and terrified citizens have become.

Even with the challenges that come with it, political communication through social media is one of the best options available in developing democracies. Research done in Ghana, Indonesia, and Nigeria emphasises the importance of social media in helping citizens ‘name-and-shame’ public officials, track government contracts, and lead youth civic reform rallies (Inobemhe et al., 2024; Njau et al., 2025; Odoh & Olagunju, 2025). Barma and Thapa (2025) researched social media activism in Gen Z protests in Nepal

and underscored the importance of social media not just for the activism it fuels, but for the sense of community it creates. Digital activists see and feel corruption as an injustice that strips a person of their dignity. They sense intergenerational rage, transforming governance from an abstract construct to a tangible, felt experience, a visceral reality to many people across the globe. For the activism to remain effective, it should be supported by systems that include legislation on free speech, schooling systems that teach digital citizenship and literacy, and a social norm of accountable governance within a democracy. Soegiono et al. (2025) contend that, without these systems, digital activism is just a performance and will not bring any meaningful change.

In emerging democracies, social media activism brings a new perspective to the discourse of accountability. The greatest challenge, though, is enacting meaningful institutional change that addresses the anger displayed online (Bhattarai, 2025). This reveals that social media activism's transformative potential is primarily driven by change that needs to happen at the institutional level.

#### **4. Methodology**

The survey research design was adopted for this study. It is a cost-effective way of obtaining research data. It also allows for the collection of data that captures the sentiment, attitudes, and behavioural intentions of respondents across multiple locations at a given moment (Asemah & Nwaoboli, 2024). For this study, data was predominantly collected using a structured instrument that we developed based on the objectives of the study. This included several sections that analysed awareness along with information sources and perceptions of civic participation, and attitudes regarding civic participation. The researchers ensured that the instrument received validation from one political communication scholar and one social research scholar regarding.

The focus of this study was on Generation Z in three states of North East Nigeria: Borno, Adamawa and Gombe. These states are comparatively younger with regards to population structure, socio-economic challenges, and digital activity, especially with regard to unemployment, bad governance and



insecurity, which resemble the challenges facing the youth in Nepal (Odoh & Olagunju, 2025). Borno State has an estimated population of 6,850,000, Adamawa State 4,350,000, and Gombe State 3,450,000, totalling approximately 14,650,000 (Weber, 2018).

Population projections by the National Population Commission (2023) for Nigeria, Nigeria demographic survey estimates of the National Bureau of Statistics, and Nigeria population mapping studies, for the Generation Z population of age 16 to 29 which constitutes 32% of the total population, estimated the Generation Z population in these three states to be 4,688,000 (32% of 14,650,000). For the sample size, the calculation technique by Taro Yamane (1967) was used:  $n = (N)/(1+N(e)^2)$ . For this case,  $e$ , the margin of error was taken as 0.05. Thus  $n = 4,688,000/11,720.01 = 400$  (rounded to the whole number) which served as the sample size 400. To ensure representativeness, this was proportionately allocated across the three states by population size.

The researchers created a survey using Google Forms to collect responses from Gen Zs. WhatsApp, Facebook, and X were used to distribute the google form because the target population is active on these platforms. Before taking the survey, participants were asked for informed consent and assured that their responses would be confidential. The study examined relationships within the framework of attitudinal activism. It comprised awareness attitudes, perceptions of activism, activism effectiveness in regard to anticorruption, and activism change. Descriptive statistics was used to study relationships among the framework variables and supplemented with regression analysis. This methodology was chosen because the study centred on respondents' perceptions and behaviours regarding transnational digital activism.

To strengthen the methodological rigour of this study, after expert validation, pilot test was carried out with thirty (small group) of Gen Zs outside the main sample. The resulting data was used to ascertain internal consistency. The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) showed a 0.70 result which is solid and confirms the items measures the required constructs with sufficient stability and coherence. For the sampling, the study proportionally

spilt the survey by state Borno, Adamawa, and Gombe, using each state's actual share of the Gen Z population. That way, the sample matched the demographics of digitally active Gen Zs and made it easier and more direct to reach a balanced, representative group across all three states.

## 5. Findings

Out of the 400-given questionnaire, 367 were completed and returned, giving a return rate of 91.8%. This return rate is acceptable for general quantitative social research. The researchers focused on descriptive (mean and standard deviation) coding to determine and define the trends of opinion within the group. A five-point Likert scale rating was used. Those items which generated a mean score of 3.00 and above were accepted while those which scored below 3.00 were rejected.

**Table 5.1** *Determine the level of awareness of North-East Nigerian Gen Zs about the September 2025 social media driven activism in Nepal*

Statement	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Decision
I am aware of the September 2025 'Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism' activism in Nepal.	54.2	29.7	10.2	5.9	3.92	0.86	Accepted
I have watched short videos or posts on social media about the Nepal activism.	49.0	34.6	9.5	6.9	3.78	0.94	Accepted
The activism was well covered by online influencers and youth pages I follow.	46.3	32.1	12.8	8.8	3.66	0.97	Accepted

**Source:** Field Survey, 2025

Table 5.1 illustrates considerable awareness of the activism in Nepal, as reflected in the overall mean score of 3.79. Social media, particularly online videos and influencer content, was the main source of activism awareness for respondents. It highlights the trend found in developing nations whereby social media serves as the primary means of awareness for Gen Z.

**Table 5.2** *Identify the main social media platforms through which respondents learned about the activism*

Platform	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Decision
TikTok	51.5	28.9	12.3	7.3	3.83	0.98	Accepted
Instagram	48.7	30.0	14.4	6.9	3.76	0.91	Accepted
Twitter/X	44.4	33.5	13.1	9.0	3.64	0.96	Accepted
WhatsApp	41.1	36.8	13.6	8.5	3.59	0.95	Accepted
YouTube	35.7	31.1	17.2	16.0	3.36	1.01	Accepted
Facebook	33.1	28.3	20.9	17.7	3.14	1.08	Accepted
Television	21.2	23.4	27.6	27.8	2.38	1.04	Rejected
Radio	15.6	19.8	32.3	32.3	2.18	0.99	Rejected

**Source:** Field Survey, 2025

Table 5.2 illustrates that the social media platforms that participants predominantly used to access information regarding activism were TikTok, Instagram, and Twitter/X, all of which obtained 3.5 as an average score. On the contrary, the traditional media formats of television and radio scored below 2.5, thus considering them inadequate sources.

**Table 5.3** *Examine perceptions of the effectiveness of the Nepal activism*

Statement	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Decision
I believe the activism in Nepal is effective in raising awareness about corruption and nepotism in Nigeria.	53.4	30.8	10.7	5.1	3.91	0.89	Accepted
The Nepal activism has drawn global attention to youth empowerment and accountability in Nigeria.	46.6	34.9	9.8	8.7	3.67	0.96	Accepted
The activism has inspired discussions among Nigerian youths in developing countries.	41.5	36.2	13.4	8.9	3.53	0.93	Accepted

**Source:** Field Survey, 2025

Table 5.3 shows that responders consider activism in Nepal effective in creating awareness on the anti-corruption campaign as the average value is above 3.6. This aligns with Bhattarai (2025) which stated that activism in the digital networks can transform the engagement processes of the youth in governance and participations by escalating visibility in the inclusion of decision making. This also connects to Ihuoma (2025) whose focus is on viral online campaigns and their cross-border accountability mechanisms.

**Table 5.4** *Ascertain whether learning about the Nepal activism has influenced respondents' anti-corruption attitudes*

Statement	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Decision
Learning about the Nepal activism has improved my attitude toward anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria.	42.3	37.1	12.8	7.8	3.57	0.94	Accepted
I am now more likely to participate in youth-led anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria.	38.5	35.8	15.6	10.1	3.41	0.98	Accepted
Youth activism can bring tangible changes in governance if properly organised.	49.3	33.7	10.2	6.8	3.82	0.90	Accepted
I feel motivated to discuss corruption and nepotism with	45.5	36.4	11.2	6.9	3.68	0.91	Accepted

**Source:** Field Survey, 2025

Table 5.4 showed that respondents rated the statements on average above 3.4 implying that learning about the Nepal activism has influenced respondents' anti-corruption attitudes. This is in tandem with the argument presented by Odoh and Olagunju (2025) that exposure to global reformist content 's youth activism on the agenda of national accountability. The inclination of respondents to engage with local conversations on corruption is in line with the observations made by Soegiono et al. (2025), which stated that 'youth

digital dialogue in transitional democracies' promotes resilience to cynicism of governance.

## **6. Discussion**

Findings of this study showed that North-East Nigerian Gen Zs demonstrate awareness of Nepali activism and activism in the September 2025 "Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism" movements. This phenomenon illustrates the extent to which social media has closed the gaps between different countries and cultures and allows the youth to monitor and engage in distant activism. Concerning the global youth populations, Odoh and Olagunju (2025) remark social media technology articulates reform and accountability closing the socio-political gap. Alkali (2024) states the predominant 2023 Nepali activism as the Nigerian Gen Z's "primary activism awareness" was social media short clips and influencer content. There is much greater social media reality as the works of Inobemhe et al. (2024) and other research, elaborate on, the social media risk activism of developed democracies and the civic education social networks dangerously lack for democracy.

Moreover, findings showed that younger consumers of media continue to regard TikTok, Instagram, and X (formerly Twitter) as the principal sources for news and information on the coverage of the Nepalese movement while older media, such as radio and television, remain underappreciated. This indicates a significant preference for youth information consumption that Ja'afaru and Asemah (2024) describe as more visual, interactive, and portable. Njau, Ndiga, and Kitonga (2025) argue that the value of digital media in the context of youth advocacy for participatory governance is far more present and impactful than traditional media.

Consequently, the findings suggest that the methods used to engage the youth of Nigeria in anti-corruption advocacy should be digitally oriented. In addition, Bhattarai (2025) comments on the digitally active younger population who tend to unilaterally assign social visibility to their channels as their primary influence and power rationale. This is why, in the Nigerian context, advocates for civics education for governance alongside the government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should emulate the

Nepalese approach in using emotionally engaging, narrative nonfiction, and data-driven stories that align with themes of youth advocacy and governance.

Several respondents expressed admiration for the activism carried out by Nepalese focusing on issues faced by younger Nigerians. Many noted that the activism sparked global conversations regarding youth disempowerment, accountability, and corruption. This feels aligned with Ihuoma (2025) who explains that experiencing youth activism from a different country invokes some form of ‘digital empathy’ in which a person can connect dislocated activism experience to their own. For the current study, the existence of cross-border activism suggests more than informing the activists on global issues; it indicates deeper self-reflection and a heightened level of activism. The awareness-participation link in this study suggests that knowledge of anti-corruption activism in other countries can ignite belief in their own country’s potential for change. This is similar to the digital activism observations made by Soegiono, Ningrum, Al Ghofiqi, Hariani, and Supeno (2025) which described ‘behavioral contagion’ where online participants from less developed countries mimic the political and democratic practices of more developed countries.

Furthermore, evidence shows how the Nepalese movement interacted with and shaped the views of young Nigerian Zs on taking part in activism. A good deal of the participants picked the activism as motivation in joining the youth-initiated activism and discussions on corruption and nepotism. This underscores the influence of civil movements abroad and the self-reflective impact on the civic movements and democracy of the global south. Bhattarai (2025) explains how transnational activism reverses the civil accountability ladder and illustrates how citizens, and not the state, initiate movements to demand accountability. This is, for Nigeria, what these findings illustrate. Active youth participation in the Nepalese protests is a clear indication that young people are politically and civically engaged, and are simply ‘waiting’ for direct, unmediated avenues to concretely assert their civic identity.

These findings align with Networked Publics Theory. This is because, digital platforms do not just help people talk, they actually create new spaces

where folks come together, make sense of what is happening, and rally around things they care about. Gen Z's heavy use of TikTok, Instagram, and X, and how they draw inspiration from the Nepalese movement shows how these online spaces break down borders and build what Boyd calls persistent, searchable, and globally connected publics. The kind of cross-border "behavioral contagion" this study picked up on fits into the theory. Suffice it to say that the findings agree with the theoretical foundation of this study because digital networks let stories and ideas spread fast, shaping how people think and act as citizens.

## **7. Conclusion**

This study was carried out to examine 'North-East Nigerian Gen Z's Perceptions of Social-Media-Driven September 2025 Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism Activism in Nepal. Unlike in the East, activism in Nigeria is highly concentrated on social media, particularly TikTok, Instagram, and X, which serve as the main platforms for the dissemination of information and activism. The activism, particularly Gen Z Against Corruption and Nepotism, emphasises the reality that young people on these platforms are not merely passive users. Large volumes of socially educational materials related to advocacy, governance and reform are available for these young people to consume. Nigerian Gen Zs in the North-East considered the activism aimed at anti-accountability sufficiently appropriate and encouraged active participation in anti-corruption advocacy in Nigeria. This is indicative of the transformative capacity and the impact of social movements in developing democracies. Neoliberal social movements, therefore, serve as a conduit for global activist engagement and the activation of citizenship in the home nation.

That said, there are a few limitations of the study to keep in mind. The study leans on self-reported online surveys, so Gen Zs without much digital access are excluded. Plus, even though the sample was spread out proportionally, it is still limited in randomisation since it was all digital platform-based. One more thing, the research does not track long-term change. It is more of a snapshot, focused on how people felt at one moment.



Still, even with these limits, the data give real insight into how networked publics drive youth activism across borders thus making the findings reliable.

## **8. Recommendations**

In light of the results, the following is recommended:

- Like youth-led movements in other countries, Nigerian anti-corruption agencies and NGOs have the capacity to develop appealing and engaging online materials. Using creative advocacy, collaborating with social media influencers, and leveraging social media challenges will help capture the attention of Generation Z and promote advocacy.
- In Nigeria and other developing countries, youth organisations should implement cross-border partnership initiatives with organisations in other countries for experience sharing, and collaboratively develop frameworks that adopt more inclusive, innovative, and sustainable approaches to tackling corruption and nepotism, particularly in cross-border urban centres.
- Incorporating civic technology training into school curricula, as well as into training programs for youth organisations and government agencies, would empower young people to channel social media use positively for civic accountability and community development.

## **References**

- Adhikari, D. R. (2020). Sustainable employment relations in Nepal: Beyond the rhetoric, ideal and rational human resource management. In *Management for sustainable and inclusive development in a transforming Asia* (pp. 25–57). Singapore: Springer Singapore.
- Akinyetun, T. S. (2025). Identity politics, conflict, and national integration in Nigeria: The youths' perspective. *African Identities*, 23(3), 515–533.
- Ameh, S. O., Anande, T. J., & Nnam, E. (2025). Political godfatherism as a catalyst for corruption and impunity in Nigeria. *Educational Research (IJMCER)*, 7(2), 48–58.

- Anagu, E., Ja'afaru, S. G. & Inobemhe, K. (2024). Verified Views: How blockchain-enabled digital identity verification can combat fake accounts and disinformation on social media. *International Journal of Emerging Multidisciplinaries: Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence*, 3(1), 1-20.
- Asemah, E. S. & Nwaoboli, E. P. (2024). *Seminar writing and presentation in media and communication studies*. Jos: Jos University Press.
- Ayobolu, O. O. (2025). Nigerian political parties and the phenomenology of issues-based campaigns: A critical appraisal of the philosophical orientation of political parties in Nigeria since 1999. *Nigerian Journal of Arts and Humanities (NJAHA)*, 5(1).
- Azeez, I. A. A., & Bhatti, M. T. (2025). The impact of corruption on political institutions and democracy in South Asia: Case study of Pakistan. *International Journal of Applied and Scientific Research*, 3(8), 649–662.
- Barma, P., & Thapa, S. (2025). The 2025 Nepalese Gen-Z protests: A structuralist analysis of youth mobilisation, political transformation, and governance reform. *Political Transformation and Governance Reform* (September 1, 2025).
- Bhattarai, G. (2025). Making of Nepali elitism: Weaving caste and land into power. In *Nepal's power elites: Rajahs, Ranas and Republic* (pp. 85–183). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.
- Bhattarai, G. (2025). Nepotism in ambassadorial appointments. In *Nepal's power elites: Rajahs, Ranas and Republic* (pp. 435–459). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.
- Ifejika, S. I. (2025). A nation's worst enemy: Did anything change with the 'syndrome' of corruption in Nigeria's response to the COVID-19 pandemic? *Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления*, (6), 141–163.

- Ihuoma, C. (2025). Digital activism and political accountability: Evaluating the impact of #EndBadGovernance on governance reforms in Nigeria. *Journal of Global Perspectives in Communication and Media*, 1(86).
- Inobemhe, K, Ja'afaru, S. G., Santas, T. & Ogbesoh, A. T. (2024). Role of social media in enabling communication mobilisation and management during 2020 #EndSARS protests in Nigeria. *Media and Communication Review*, 4(2), 210-235.
- Islam, S., & Mohna, H. A. (2025). Comparative analysis of political economy models in South Asia and their impact on public sector reform. *Review of Applied Science and Technology*, 3(1), 1–39.
- Ja'afaru, S. G., & Asemah, E. S. (2024). How social media shape public opinion through propaganda and the spread of disinformation. In E. S. Asemah (Ed.), *Communication and media dynamics* (pp. 26–41). Enugu: Franklead Printing and Publishing Company.
- Khadka, P. D. (2025). The dream of a socialism-oriented society in Nepal: The discrepancy between rhetoric and reality in political practices. *Spectrum of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 1(1), 103–113.
- Lorenz, T. (2022). *Soro Soke: The young disruptors of an African megacity*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mazumdar, S. (2025). Politics as fun: Countering Indian digital nationalism with viral videos. *Television & New Media*, 26(3), 373–389.
- Musya, J. (2025). Generation Z revolts and implications on political change in Kenya: Lessons learned. *Journal of African Interdisciplinary Studies*, 9(7), 14–24.
- Njau, G. W., Ndiga, B., & Kitonga, D. M. (2025). Exploring how students' online activism contributes to leaders' accountability by promoting transparency in resource management in selected public universities

- in Nairobi, Kenya. *Journal of African Interdisciplinary Studies*, 9(7), 176–205.
- Njoku, E. C. (2025). Democracy, ethnic politics and nation building in Nigeria, 2015–2024. *Journal of Nation-Building & Policy Studies*, 9(1).
- Obicci, P. A. (2025). Corrupt elites, administrative cadres and public service in Africa: Islands of vanity. *Journal of Management and Science*, 15(1), 42–82.
- Odoh, A., & Olagunju, A. T. (2025). The role of social media in combating corruption, promoting accountability, and sustainable development in Nigeria's democracy. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 41(2), 242–267.
- Oluranti, A. Y. (2025). Corruption in Nigeria: A new paradigm for underdevelopment. *Islamic University Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(3), 610–631.
- Omilusi, M. (2025). Participatory governance and youth protests in the digital age: Interrogating the #EndSARS movement. *African Security*, 1–23.
- Omoyeni, T. J., Omotayo, B. J., & Onuoha, A. U. (2025). The casualties of greed: Governance crises, development stagnation, and the quest for institutional reforms in Nigeria. *Kashere Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 3(4), 36–52.
- Pandey, C. L. (2023). Capturing the role of civil society for urban sustainability in Nepal. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 36(3), 349–365.
- Paudel, K. R., & Phuyel, S. P. (2025). Strengthening democracy in Nepal: The role of trust, transparency, and anti-corruption. *Perspectives on Higher Education*, 15(2), 103–120.

- Pozsgai-Alvarez, J. (2025). Three-dimensional corruption metrics: A proposal for integrating frequency, cost, and significance. *Social Indicators Research*, 178(1), 39–62.
- Reza, S. A., & Bhuiyan, M. M. U. (2025). Analyzing the role of key stakeholders in the July uprising 2024 in Bangladesh: Actors and factors approach. *Journal of Political Science*, 25, 214–237.
- Shrestha, R., & Jenkins, B. (2019). Understanding youth political violence in Nepal. *Millennial Asia*, 10(1), 56–75.
- Soegiono, A. N., Ningrum, A. P., Al Ghofiqi, M. D., Hariani, N. J., & Supeno, E. (2025). The price of politics: Institutional reengineering as anti-corruption dismantlement under Jokowi's administration (2014–2024). *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial*, 24(1), 92–121.
- Sony, K. C., Bigler, C., & Thieme, S. (2025). Claiming justice in the health sector of Nepal: Exploring causes and consequences of protests among health care workers. *Dialogues in Health*, 100223.
- Sultana, S., & Sharma, B. K. (2025). Rap in the local–global interface: Social and political activism in South Asia. In *Entangled Englishes* (pp. 32–51). U: Routledge.